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‘Life is not only an “event” that happens – but also something that is suffered’; 
this is the core principle of what Viktor von Weizsäcker (1886–1957), the 
German physician and founder of a ‘Medical Anthropology’, called the ‘pathic’ 
dimension. The personal voice of the human being himself becomes a con-
stitutive principle within the medium of science. Concepts of cause and effect 
are no longer applicable in the customary functional sense of aetiology. Even 
the intellect or spirit (Geist) can no longer be regarded as unscathed. In order 
to handle pathic ‘causality’ Weizsäcker introduced his ‘pathic pentagram’. 
The interplay of fi ve modalities – must / may / want / should / can – creates a 
ground or reason of psychological and/or somatic explanation. Necessity and 
freedom of a person appear interwoven in a constitutive manner.
Keywords: causality; freedom; Geist (spirit); medical anthropology; pathic 
existence; Viktor von Weizsäcker
Viktor von Weizsäcker, a medical doctor and a seminal thinker in what he called 
‘anthropological medicine’, is not known to the same extent as, for instance, 
Karl Jaspers. So I will fi rst give some details of his biography.1 Weizsäcker was 
born on 21 April 1886 in Stuttgart, the son of Karl Weizsäcker who was then 
prime minister of the state of Württemberg in Bismarck’s Germany.2
In 1904 Viktor began studies in medicine at Tübingen University, and then 
continued in Freiburg and in Berlin. He fi nished with the state examination 
in medicine at Heidelberg University and a dissertation on the question of 
the velocity of blood circulation in cases of anaemia. After seven years as an 
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assistant under Ludolf von Krehl in Heidelberg – interrupted by research work 
with Johannes von Kries in Freiburg and with Archibald Vivian Hill (later a 
Nobel laureate) in Cambridge – he did his habilitation post-doctorate in internal 
medicine in 1917, with a thesis on the energetics of the cardiac muscle. In 1920 
he became head of the Department of Neurology founded by Wilhelm Erb in 
the Clinic for Internal Medicine in Heidelberg. In 1941 he was appointed, as 
successor of Otfrid Foerster, to the most prestigious chair in Neurology in 
Germany at the University in Breslau. In 1945 the Heidelberg Medical School 
established a chair in General Clinical Medicine especially for him. In 1952, 
ill with Parkinson’s, he requested early retirement.
After befriending Franz Rosenzweig in 1906, Weizsäcker had a lifelong and 
very intense interest and involvement with philosophy and theology, in addition 
to his training as a medical doctor and researcher. His studies under Wilhelm 
Windelband and Jonas Cohn, and encounters with Martin Buber, Hans 
Ehrenberg, Romano Guardini, Eugen Rosenstock and Max Scheler, among 
others, contributed signifi cantly to the establishment of medical anthropology as 
Weizsäcker con-ceived it. His fi rst explicitly programmatic publications on this 
subject were his ‘Stücke einer medizinischen Anthropologie’. They appeared in 
1926 and 1928 in the journal Die Kreatur, on which he served as a co-editor, 
with Martin Buber and Joseph Wittig (Weizsäcker, 1926 and 1928: 7–66).
Weizsäcker developed an early interest in Freudian psychoanalysis, which 
was decisive for a psychological and physical-organic understanding of human 
disease and the state of ‘being ill’. He also observed with great interest the 
epistemological crisis in modern physics and contemporary existentialism. With 
these preconditions as a framework, even what is researched and taught from 
a purely natural-scientifi c and physiological perspective falls, in Weizsäcker’s 
approach, under the revealing light of an engaged encounter with the living 
breathing human being. ‘Whoever wants to investigate living creatures must 
take part in life’ was his core principle.3 Weizsäcker never tried to postulate 
some sort of immovable objectivity of living matter behind the personal and 
historically determined character of this standpoint.
He died in 1957 in Heidelberg. In 1994 the Viktor von Weizsäcker Society 
was established, and is now quite active.4 None of his works seems to be avail-
able in English translation.
The crisis of cause and effect
What does the concept ‘causality’ mean in such a conception of life? Or, to put 
it in a more concrete context: in what way do we have to think when we in-
quire into cause and effect in the interplay between falling sick and recovering 
health as a dynamic process? Initially, it is crucial to see the human being in 
his fundamental dual nature. On the one hand, he is a subject of knowledge 
and simultaneously an object of an objectifying functional analysis, such as in 
the established disciplines of physiology or psychology. On the other, the 
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human being is a person experiencing and suffering life. Weizsäcker’s distinc-
tive contribution is not that he discovered this duality of existence, since many 
did that before him, but that he seeks a bridging between the two aspects, and 
in such a fundamental way that sometimes it seems to be almost impossible to 
distinguish between them in the fusion. In so doing, Weizsäcker wishes to bring 
the personal voice of the researcher on life or the physician himself to the fore to 
be heard in the medium of science. Inter alia, this means that the distance be-
tween the persons involved, such as between the patient and therapist, must, 
despite its importance, be repeatedly charted and surveyed anew.
Here is a key difference when Weizsäcker is compared with Karl Jaspers. For 
Weizsäcker, ‘to take part in life’ means to extend into one’s own self as doctor 
and researcher the dynamics of sickness and recovery as experienced in the other 
person. Professionally defi ned, scientifi c ‘demands of Reason … necessitate him 
to the insight that you cannot speak truthfully about organism and life with-
out stating that life is not only an “event” that happens – but also something 
that is suffered.’ (Weizsäcker, 1950: 312–13).5 In his view, a person can seek 
out the traces of truth only if he/she is ready to take the risk of an experience of 
unity that pushes forward to the very boundary of science and therapy. When 
this sort of approach is used, both science and therapy are always endangered, 
but only in order to prove the value of both from their ‘ground’ or foundation 
up. This ‘ground’ also encompasses what we are looking for here: it designates 
the locus to which the question of cause and effect must be addressed in order 
to expect an answer.
The cause [Ursache] is not a thing [Sache] here. The German prefi x ‘Ur’ 
before this thing fortunately comes to designate not only an action but also 
points toward a beginning. It meant origin … But biological genetics cannot 
dispense with this concept of an origin. (Weizsäcker, 1950: 314)6
Let us attempt to understand his conception better. Weizsäcker’s empirical 
basis lies in numerous clinical observations, and most particularly in experi-
ments on the physiology of sense perception. According to this – and I limit 
myself initially only to the clinical aspect – it is not possible to distinguish with 
accuracy, either in connection with illness or recovery, between those parts of 
something living which are in the process of falling ill or recovering, and those 
not affected by this.7 This observation is fundamental and is not in confl ict 
with the pragmatic insight that says, in many cases, that it is almost necessary 
and quite helpful to draw a borderline between parts affected and not affected. 
Thus, if you have a cold, as a rule you are satisfi ed with some treatment for the 
upper respiratory system, or if your bone is broken, with the fracture being set. 
You will not worry much about this becoming a disease affecting other parts 
of the body, or even your mental make-up and psyche. There is a similar prag-
matism in operation when, say for reasons of insurance law, health is largely 
equated with a person’s ‘fi tness’, i.e., capacity to work; we tend to judge both 
sickness and restoration from the criterion of such ‘fi tness’ for the job. That is 
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crucial for the capacity to work in general and in each special case. Experience 
confi rms the correctness of this pragmatism. There is no doubt, for example, 
that reintegration back into everyday vocational life has the meaning of being 
well and healthy, especially in the case of the handicapped or mentally ill.
As long as this distinction between affected and non-affected parts is viewed 
as valid, one can also speak with the same right of cause and effect. Against the 
backdrop of the functional theory, which has become dominant in medicine 
over the course of the last 150 years, this means: what in a concrete indi-
vidual case can be localized as the source of a dysfunction, in the context of a 
general biological functional analysis (say of the respiratory system, the limbs, 
socio-psychological make-up) will then be regarded as the cause of the illness. 
Correspondingly, if you remove this cause or eliminate its effect, you can with 
a certain justifi cation expect the health of the patient to improve.
Yet the following has to be taken into account here: all these cases of a 
pragmatic distinction or drawing of a borderline between affected and non-
affected, sick and healthy parts of the organism, are only medically meaningful 
because ultimately they have consequences for the physical and mental well-
being of a human being as a whole. As a direct result of this, the drawing of 
a borderline relativizes itself implicitly, and leads back in turn to refl ection on 
basic principles. It confi rms, through its actual impact on the total picture – in 
a favourable case with good results – that in terms of the theory of principles, 
the boundary between sick and healthy, between parts that are recovering 
and other parts not recovering, must remain indeterminate, fuzzy.
As long as success continues, that may be regarded as unimportant. But 
on the other hand, there are numerous and statistically increasing diffi culties 
with causal and functional aetiology and therapy of chronic as well as acute 
maladies. These are only two tips of an iceberg, so to speak. Here, to draw 
a line between healthy and sick parts contributes little that is helpful. It may 
even worsen the sickness considerably through its therapeutic consequences.8 
So drawing a pragmatic boundary is sometimes successful, sometimes harmful. 
In view of this, is it still possible to adhere to the notion of a critically testable 
unity of medicine? If one does not wish here to make the accident of success 
a principle, then one has to recognize a basic indeterminacy of the boundary 
between sickness and health, according it a place in the notion of the unity 
of medicine.
This doubtless will engender a very palpable sense of insecurity. In this 
instance, the concepts of cause and effect are no longer applicable in the 
customary functional sense; it becomes somewhat unclear whether they can 
be operationalized in clinical procedures of diagnosis and therapy at all. 
Because with a fundamental indeterminacy, the criterion and the measure 
(where quantitative distinctions play a role) doubtless threaten to be lost when 
it comes to a big question: where and how can we distinguish precisely be-
tween sick and healthy, and how this can be measured? Because criterion 
and scale of measurement can only be clearly determined, that is part of their 
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defi nition, as contrasted with a questionable variability. But even that is no 
longer valid for the central organ of human judgement in forming criteria and 
norms, the intellect or spirit, or in German, Geist. Where total well-being is in 
question, of course the Geist can no longer be regarded as unscathed. In order 
to single out and emphasize this problem, Weizsäcker raises once again the 
concept of ‘mental illness’, sickness of the Geist, and does so in a very funda-
mental way: the Geist is also in danger of falling ill, and not just in the case of 
the classic ‘mental illnesses’ (Weizsäcker, 2007: 125–8). Every sickness also 
affects Geist; but to what degree? In each single case, that question looms anew, 
and cannot be answered a priori. If we phrase it in connection with the crisis 
of cause and effect – aitía and symptom – it is something like this: if the power 
of human judgement itself is in doubt, then its ability to deal in a critically 
accountable way with cause and effect crumbles away. Discourse about cause 
and effect in general threatens to become meaningless.
The ‘contact’ between function and pathic experiencing
Let us look at a concrete example: in the framework of a set of case studies 
of defi nite, not accidentally neurotic heart ailments, Weizsäcker wonders 
inter alia about the reason behind these maladies (and I also read the word 
‘reason’, as I said, as ‘cause’). His intention is to derive pathways to recovery 
through this discussion. In many cases, a physiological causal analysis can 
fi nd no reason for the illness beyond the initial diagnostic fi ndings. For that 
reason, Weizsäcker, supplementing physiology, looks in the personal history 
of suffering of the patient, i.e., in what he calls ‘pathic experiencing’, to fi nd 
some reason. The question then is whether, after this supplement, a causal 
hypothesis (if expanded) can be formulated anew: is there then a new insight 
into aitía and symptom, diagnostically and therapeutically capable of being 
operationalized – one which does justice both to pathic experiencing and to the 
physiological diagnostic fi ndings? This is a precarious demand in terms of the 
logic of knowledge, because neither physiology nor conscious experiencing and 
narration by the patient are adequate authorities in this case. Why? Because 
even in the ‘consciousness of the patient’, the reason of the illness sought – the 
‘leading element’, as Weizsäcker says – is ‘not given in accord with the nature 
of the crisis’; and above all else: it ‘cannot be a given’. He continues: ‘But 
favourable circumstances can bring it to the fore, and in contact with symptom 
and with consciousness.’ (Weizsäcker, 1932: 113; see also Creuz, 1999: 51).
We have arrived at a key concept in his thinking, namely ‘contact’. The 
‘contact’ between a ‘leading element’ and ‘symptom and consciousness’ is 
what is supposed to facilitate a correct correlation between pathic experiencing 
and the functional hypothesis. He mentions the fact that, independent of the 
state of consciousness and epistemological disposition of both the patient and 
the therapist, there are observable bridges between the reason and the phe-
nomenon, between aitía and symptom. Even more: the ‘contact’ signifi es the 
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pathically and ontologically fundamental establishing of this fact itself. He 
thus instals here nothing less than the general possibility of being able to judge 
about cause and effect in an expanded form. According to Weizsäcker, life as 
a whole appears as a consequence of such ‘contact’ events, as a continuously 
prolonged interaction (Umgang) between functional and pathic elements.
Let us pause for a minute. We cannot deny that Weizsäcker’s reports about 
‘favourable circumstances’ which give rise to such ‘contacts’ are based on 
long years of clinical experience. But at least as a fi rst step, to think about this 
experience in a strict manner demands critical distance: are we not dealing here 
with a sort of mystifi cation, in the form of a rhetoric of unity or event which 
covers over and conceals the aporia of a tension that cannot be illuminated? Is 
it not fi rst necessary, before trusting such ‘contact’ experiences, that initially we 
take the two elements, the ‘leading element’ and ‘symptom and consciousness’, 
and look at each one separately, investigating its disposition for establishing 
contact? Weizsäcker gives a great deal of importance, maybe too much, to the 
‘favourable circumstances’. In contrast, critical reason cannot attribute much 
more to them than that they are the last small plus, the bit that only brings to 
completion what was basically present already. Only then, it would seem, if it 
is possible to draft the possibility of contact moving from the clarifi ed pre-
requisites for each of these, would it be permissible to agree with its subsequent 
realization – without suspicion of false pretence, insanity or hallucination.
But it is precisely that which has no success; it does not work. The sceptical 
criticism now founders on the rocks of an irresolvable ambiguity within the 
object itself. The elements in question, both the ‘leading element’ and ‘symptom 
and consciousness’, are in themselves ambiguous. In both, pathic experi-
encing and the functionally determinable element appear side by side, and yet 
remain impossible to combine. As far as the ‘leading element’ is concerned, 
Weizsäcker’s personal tendency is to give more emphasis to pathic experiencing. 
The abundance of his examples for biographically ‘pathic’ aetiologies seems to 
indicate this. But it is clear: the ‘pathic’ hypothesis retains its epistemic value 
only as long as the competing hypothesis remains a real alternative, namely: that 
a pathic event is not ‘leading’ here, but rather a specifi c functional logic. The 
problem of the ‘leading element’ has, Janus-like, two faces. This remains valid 
in terms of the critique of knowledge, even if the dire need to fi nd an answer 
forces us to take the risk of giving preference to one of the two views. It is and 
remains a risky venture because relegating one or the other motive to secondary 
status cannot be justifi ed using means grounded on the logic of knowledge. 
Let us now take a look at the opposite side of ‘symptom and consciousness’. 
Depending on which of the two interpretative motifs was given preference on 
the side of the ‘leading element’, the other one appears here as the opposite 
number, counterposed. The unavoidable ambiguity inherent in the ‘leading 
element’ returns here in a kind of mirror image. Either functionally determined 
sequences are considered a symptom (if a pathic experiencing was largely 
determined to be the ‘leading’ element), or passionate-pathic experiences are 
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considered a symptom (if functional mechanisms were largely determined to 
be the ‘leading’ element). Research on cause and effect cannot provide more 
than this groundwork for a decision that is always risky. A dispute between 
competing hypotheses remains.
Indeed, dispute seems to be the fi nal word here, and it is impossible to avoid 
it. The provocative point of that lance of disagreement lies in the observation 
that ambiguity is itself a fact. It does not designate confusion or a logical error 
of interpretive refl ection, but is a factum brutum. Medical anthropology only 
knows ambiguous life experiences. So the critical question bounces back all 
the more urgently: where is the justifi cation to take a risk – based on this 
fragile fact? The answer appears to be pretty banal: the justifi cation lies in the 
consequences of the effort. Justifi cation is based on success in exactly what, 
seen with the means of the refl ective power of judgement, could never arise 
except from a constitutively ambiguous ground, and repeatedly can so arise. 
This is a knowledge which grows during the personal duration of a human life: it 
is thus life experience, its fruit. Whoever has it knows: there has always been 
this ambiguity, and new contact events have always arisen from a decided one-
sidedness in interpretation and action. So there is new hope that likewise in 
the current emergency, such a ‘contact’ will come to pass and take us further. 
Its basis of experience lies in the fact that the way into the present necessarily 
had to pass over a rocky road of numerous risks of a similar kind. In this way, 
the constitutive twilight of elements loses its destructive character. The logical 
impossibility to clarify can be accepted. The successes in contact justify the 
twilight of its sources.
The previous constellation of problem and solution is now reversed. The 
original genesis of the problem dealt with here, including the question of cause 
and effect, lay initially in the experience of our fragile life, oscillating between 
aspects not reconciled and opposed. This immediately present experience of 
suffering now always presupposes successful contact; the concrete experience 
of life over time also shows this. We thus stand before a hermeneutic circle. The 
very problem itself from which medical anthropology emerges is a retro-oriented 
construction, a memory consisting of elements of things that have already 
succeeded. The problem, and with it the insecurity in life, does not therefore 
hover in the air above an absolute lack of knowledge and experience, but rather 
stands on solid ground, and always has. However, this kind of memory, and 
that is one independent autonomous step in refl ection, must be conceived as 
part of the problem. What is important is to be able to establish a relation to 
its ground by seeing what lies ahead. To know this ‘ground relation’ or ‘basic 
relation’ (Grundverhältnis), as Weizsäcker calls it, provides the basis for the 
sobriety of his anthropological discipline, which, given the two-faced character 
of the element, is otherwise hardly understandable. Where such a knowledge 
does not stand fi rmly in the background, all the descriptions of what is fragile 
and ambiguous have a tendency towards morbidity, enamoured of crisis.
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Coincidental correspondence
So contact events form the prerequisite for new contact events. One could 
regard that as a petitio principii, a presupposing of what is to be expected later 
as a result. In fact, the work of transformation is in basic terms precisely that. 
Within what has already been accomplished, in remembrance of its relation 
to the ambiguity presupposed to it, it digs up or excavates the reason or cause 
for new success that leads on further. To phrase it differently, more in terms 
of method: success that leads further is an interpretive commentary on what 
has already succeeded, looking to the future. In the formulation of the clas-
sical philologist August Böckh in the nineteenth century, it is knowledge of 
what has come to be known, Erkenntnis des Erkannten.9 The genesis of the new 
‘contact’ cannot be interpreted causally. It is not in a functional relation to the 
presupposed ground, but is the experience of an astounding and yet not un-
expected change in the situation, and this is what stands behind Weizsäcker’s 
‘favourable circumstances’. The ambiguities of the ‘leading element’ discovered 
in the ground and those of ‘symptom and consciousness’ become intermediate 
knowledge. That knowledge recedes into the background at the moment of 
success.10 The contrary dispositions of knowledge that are bound together in 
strife now fall together. Indeed, one can say, thinking of the old formula of 
coincidentia oppositorum: they fall into each other, coincide. Their contrast thus 
disappears. The crisis of illness which was the motor of the problem, and its 
quest already bears it within as a negative impetus. ‘Contact’ brings it into visible 
being qua phenomenon in a positive way. In another connection, Weizsäcker 
called this contact phenomenon the ‘mystics of incarnation’, which brings life 
into visible being and manifestation (Weizsäcker, 1949: 299 ff.).
A pupil and colleague of Weizsäcker, Alfred Prinz Auersperg, coined the 
concept of ‘coincidental correspondence’ (Auersperg, 1954).11 He took 
the decisive step in the 1930s, together with Helmut Sprockhoff and Harry 
Buhrmester Jr, through his Heidelberg experiments on the physiology of the 
senses (Auersperg and Buhrmester, 1936; Sack, 2005: 69–74). His focus was 
on dynamic forms in the relation between experienced perception and their 
physical correlate. For example, a subject looked at a square painted on a round 
disc. Then the disc was sent spinning, faster and faster. The gestalt fi gure 
which the subject actually sees goes through several phases of change as the 
disc accelerates. The original square is no longer seen as such. But again and 
again, after intermediary phases of indeterminacy experienced as a kind of crisis, 
there are fi nally clear perceptions of the gestalt, to an extent as the terminal 
phase fi gure, in a stable state, as a ‘square with an inscribed cross’ (Auersperg 
and Buhrmester, 1936: 279; Sack, 2005: 70).12 So there are repeated ‘contacts’ 
between the physical spinning movement and the gestalt-shaping vision as 
perceived of the subject. The summary conclusion in the study published at 
the time was: ‘Living happening and a physical sequence touch one another 
on a numerical temporal axis.’ (Auersperg and Buhrmester, 1936: 300; 
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Sack, 2005: 72). This means: in the course of the chronometrically determined 
time, ‘on a temporal numerical axis’, contacts occur, termed ‘coincidences’.13 It 
is these ‘coincidences’ that point in retro to a correspondence of the two elements 
which touch each other here. Only this correspondence is specifi cally noted 
as such. In contrast, an explicit (meta)physical interpretation is avoided.
This latter attitude, the reticence vis-à-vis a metaphysical hypothesis, is of 
great importance. It too has a history that tells us much. Just how diffi cult 
it was to maintain this reserve in the face of a long tradition of metaphysical 
hypothesizing can be seen in a minor but characteristic circumstance. 
Auersperg and Buhrmester had not yet spoken in their 1936 essay about ‘coin-
cidental correspondence’. Rather, the term they used was ‘coincidental 
parallelism’ (Auersperg and Buhrmester, 1936: 300; Sack, 2005: 72);14 and 
this is precisely where Weizsäcker targeted his criticism. As early as 1940, in 
the fi rst edition of his Der Gestaltkreis, he writes that Auersperg ‘recognized the 
danger of all “parallelistic” formulas, but the word has not disappeared yet from 
his terminology either’ (see Weizsäcker, 1950: 293). It is important here that 
‘coincidence’ is not prepared or its path paved by a psycho-physical or other 
type of parallelism. This means that the possibility is no longer available to link 
up with all those concepts of cause and effect that people had long associated 
with the hypothesis of psycho-physical parallelism.15 It is impossible to name 
any kind of structured symmetry between body and soul, physiological func-
tion and pathic experience, or some other ontological foundation which 
eliminates the ambiguity of the elements lying at the base (ground) of the phe-
nomenon. Auersperg and his colleagues were already guided by this insight in 
1936, but some preparation time was needed until they fi nally, in 1954, came up 
with the critically precise designation in the term ‘coincidental correspondence’ 
(Auersperg, 1954). This did not change anything in terms of the thing 
itself. Weizsäcker had already linked up with and referenced this in 1940. In 
Der Gestaltkreis, he writes:
Experience and objective stimulus [and we are allowed here, transposed 
to the context above, likewise to say ‘symptom’ and ‘leading element’ 
instead] enter into a series of coincidental correspondences. This series 
is not a ‘parallel’, but something like a double-linked chain. (Weizsäcker, 
1950: 293)
Each link is a manifestation of that contact which generates ‘favourable circum-
stances’, as he noted in his 1932 work on the heart. The reality of life moves 
in ‘coincidences’. The apt general formulation of Andreas Hanses (1999: 109) 
applies: ‘Real is what becomes possible in the individual case.’
The historical ur-concept for this was found in the Greek ‘kairos’ (see 
Auersperg, 1965: 26, title of ch. IV). This derives from the way, akin to the 
problem of diagnosis and therapy, that in ‘kairos’ ‘propitious circumstances’ also 
combine with the call to take action. In the words of Leopold Schmidt, a 
classical philologist: for the Greeks, the future was always ‘uncertain’. And 
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for that reason, it was considered a ‘great ingratitude to allow, in an attitude 
of indifference, those moments to pass in which the Gods clearly showed 
their benevolence’, i.e. to fail to act in such moments. This is the wellspring 
for the great ‘weight’ accorded ‘kairos’: in kairos, ‘the concepts emerged of 
favourable opportunity and the opportune moment, fused in an inseparable 
unity’ (Schmidt, 1882, Vol. 2: 76). Consequently, for medical anthropology, it 
is important to conceive illness as a ‘kairos’. Seen as a ‘contact’ event between 
function and pathics and at the same time as ‘kairos’, it constitutes the gate-
way leading into practice. In sickness, an active new shaping is being prepared; 
it is the ‘offering of a knowledge of truth’ (Weizsäcker, 1928: 65). No less, 
but also no more. Health is never something you ‘have’ or possess, it is ‘only 
present where it is created anew in every second of life’ (Weizsäcker, 1930: 
94).16 Health is dynamic. This ‘only’ contains the call to seize the opportunity 
to make use of the ‘contact’, thus a claim to constant motility.
Against this backdrop, let us look once more at the question of cause in 
the clinical situation. Weizsäcker (1950: 297) introduces it in this way:
It is pleasant when we can explain a paralysis by a rupture in the nerve 
path, a loss of weight by an increase in metabolism. But then we get these 
conditions and events where the process of life seems to break out of the 
prescribed trajectory of the chaining of cause and effect.
In the context of the refl ections above, these are events in which the boundary 
between affected and unaffected part of some living ensemble fails: then it is 
no longer possible, guided by critically framed criteria and norms, to isolate 
the strand of a dynamic operative causality. Often, Weizsäcker continues,
what happens is that the sequence of defi nite orders is interrupted more 
or less suddenly, when an extremely stormy event occurs. With or through 
this happening, we can see the genesis of a totally different picture, whose 
stable order once again then has the more transparent, explainable struc-
ture which permits a new causal analysis (p. 297). 
But it is impossible to derive this new condition from the earlier one. ‘For that, 
it would be necessary to explain the crisis precisely as a middle connecting 
ligament between the fi rst and third condition, and that precisely is not pos-
sible’. In this connection, not all ‘defi ciencies and gaps … in the chain of causal 
explanation’, which otherwise ‘also exist in plenitude’, are the problem. What 
is important are ‘gaps of a particular kind. The patient himself namely is the 
one who gets the strongest impression of it. More than usual, he has the feeling 
of being overwhelmed, torn apart internally, being engaged in an incompre-
hensible jump’ (p. 297). It is this unavoidable inclusion of what is pathic 
(unavoidable for the sake of medicine) that interrupts the correlation of cause 
and effect in principled terms. This is not true just for pathological cases but also 
holds for ‘a bad nervous breakdown or dizziness, or change in consciousness, 
as in schizophrenia, poison or depression’, and likewise for numerous phenomena 
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of a healthy, intensifi ed feeling of vitality, for ‘ecstasy’, ‘voluptuousness’, 
‘rapture’ (p. 297). Extremely instructive for Weizsäcker were:
individual patients who appear to give information to a high degree on just 
what is happening in and with them in the crisis they are experiencing. These 
are persons who seem to have an enhanced inner perception which allows 
them to live and perceive the critical process, far beyond what is customary. 
Not only do they change – they also experience change as such.
Through an almost ‘sensual perception of the structure of crisis’, they translate 
eventfulness ‘back … into the language of common graphic concreteness’ 
(p. 297), Anschaulichkeit in German. Thus, for example, symbolically ‘a certain 
spatial structure is experienced in a transformed way, which spatially and in 
terms of perception is no longer possible at all. That is the case, for example, 
when a patient has the fantasy that’, as the transcript of a case study puts it, 
he ‘must “straighten out” the kink in a curve “to make it a sphere”’ (p. 298). 
Mathematically or mechanically, that would be:
impossible without bending or lengthening other parts of the curve … 
The task only centred on the locus of the kink cannot be solved, it forces 
a transformation. Because a straight line would only return on itself in 
infi nity in order to satisfy the demand of the sphere. Only after the fi gure 
were expanded into infi nity or the imaginary, is it possible to bring it back 
to a perceptible magnitude, and into the realm of the perceivable, what is 
graphically concrete [anschaulich]. It must reverse, as it were, transformed 
in an infi nity, it must upend itself in the transcendental, in order once again 
to appear. So the compulsion for the impossible which the patient experiences 
is the presentation of the critical condition. The crisis is a passage of the 
unstable fi nite plane, through a transcendence, to the constancy of a fi nite 
condition.17 (p. 298; italics added)
The psychological and physical accompanying phenomena (side effects) are 
sometimes threatening: ‘anxiety, fainting, catastrophes in motion, a storm of 
movement or paralysis, etc.’. This ‘threat to the ego’ shows:
that the most essential thing about the crisis is not only the transition from 
one order to another, but the surrender of the continuity or identity of 
the subject. The subject is what is destroyed in the crack or tear, if trans-
formation does not occur (p. 298).
Narrative and pathic pentagram
So our initial question comes to a kind of head: how should we conceive such 
dramatic changes, so full of suffering and pain? Are there possibilities for 
causal therapy? A functional cause-effect relation seems impossible. And 
thus it would be mistaken to insinuate, possibly along philosophical lines, 
that the ‘intellect [i.e., Geist] as mediator between object and subject now 
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comes onstage and solves all the problems’ (Weizsäcker, 1950: 310). Rather, 
the Geist itself, as was shown, is affected by the crisis. There is ‘no elevated spot 
that from the bird’s eye view allows us to oversee the composition of all acts; 
we have to get ourselves entangled again and again in the movement of life, in 
order to comprehend even bits and fragments of it’ (p. 311). What remains is 
the empirical evidence of the coincidental correspondence mentioned earlier, 
i.e., the knowledge that pathic experiencing and those functional-objectifi ed 
circumstances, both of one’s own body and the environment, meet in indi-
vidual contacts. What does this portend for the question of cause and effect?
Initially, a precise knowledge of the physical elements of contact permits 
us to limit the spectrum of the forms, which appears almost unbounded from 
the pathic side, in a manner appropriate for the body and the environment. 
‘Anatomy and physiology describe as accurately as possible the conditions 
under which an external effect can have any infl uence whatsoever on the organs 
in a congruent form, and this alone entails a decisive selection and limitation’ 
(p. 311).
Correspondingly, from the other side ‘the self-locomotion [Selbstbewegung] 
of the organism must shape such movements which are in keeping with the 
conditions of the surrounding world. In this way, a successful act accom-
modating to these conditions is accomplished’ (p. 311). But between the 
contact events lie the dizzying ruptures of the crisis. It is what ‘leads on from 
one [contact] to the next’. How then does a ‘continuity that prevails in and 
through the discontinuities’ come about (p. 311)? The answer appears almost 
too simple: repetition, the further forming of contact that springs from pre-
vious contact events and spins on as life; the generally valid fact of coincidental 
correspondence itself is ‘what constitutes continuity. Because where subject 
and object correspond one to the other in a kind of mirror imaging in their 
encounter, there the ego is safe and secure in its environment’ (p. 312). The 
physical existence of the ‘environment’ which is counterposed to pathic experi-
encing, becomes here a supporting girder and source of security, indeed the 
basis of trust of pathic experiencing as such. In this way, what is pathic comes 
to participate in the continuity of being as recognizable in natural laws.
If then the ego can know that it is ‘safe and secure in its environment’ via the 
elements that can be objectifi ed, then it is permissible to recognize the func-
tionality of the cause-effect relation valid as a symbol, a heuristic compendium 
or guide for the interpretation of life movement (Lebensbewegung) as a whole. 
This relation cannot be more than a symbol or a heuristic compendium, because 
the performance of life encompasses the pathic aspect. The functional relation 
has no validity here. But the relation is also a symbol in a positive creative sense, 
since it suggests to the researcher the need to search for purely pathic con-
texts of motivation. It cannot be grasped functionally and objectively, but is 
grounded on knowable reasons. So the mode in which pathic ‘causality’ – or, 
better, pathic foundation – must be presented is necessarily different from 
function. It is the foundational narrative, and not only in relation to man, but 
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in biology more generally. Simply the ‘so-called pure description of the building 
of a nest, an animal community’, amounts in the end ‘to a narrative … and thus 
to an event, happening’ (p. 313). The foundational rules of narrative plaus-
ibility are valid. ‘Biology is as a matter of fact genetic, or it is nothing. For that 
reason, life descriptions, biographies, even if more incomplete, are nonetheless 
more biological than biochemistry or biophysics’ (p. 313).
We have arrived at the ‘question of causes’. But that is not answered by pos-
tulating ‘that what appears to be living stems from a process that lies behind it, 
mental or physical’. As quoted above, ‘the cause, the Ur-thing [Ursache], is not a 
thing’ (pp. 313–14). Pathic experiencing must be presented in a narrative which 
makes palpable what is real in its motives; that holds most especially for crisis. 
In the crisis, ‘the pathic rises to the heights of an exclusive power’ (p. 314). In 
terms of science, then, we are faced with the following question: are there gen-
erally valid narrative structures for the presentation and description of pathic 
causality? Weizsäcker answers with his theory of the so-called pathic pentagram. 
It postulates that the life of a human being is always at the intersection of fi ve 
categories: what he must do, is permitted to do, wants to do, should do and can 
do; the fi ve modalities are: must / may / want / should / can. ‘As a living being …, 
I don’t say “I am”, but rather: I would like, I want, or I can, must, may, should. 
Or I don’t want to, I mustn’t do all this’ (Weizsäcker, 1948: 48; cf. Weizsäcker, 
2007: 70–97). If we explain human action, a life experience, an event, we narrate 
a concrete constellation of these categories and regard the event in question 
as their effect. A human being experiences or does something because a spe-
cially confi gured web of these power factors brought him to the point of that 
action. The constellation of pathic factors does not generate a function of 
causa and effectus, but does create a ground or reason of explanation.
Freedom and necessity, ‘ground relation’ (Grundverhältnis)
We can make this clear in our own thinking using two categories: want and 
must. Their distinctive feature is their salience precisely for the humanly funda-
mental dialectics between freedom and necessity – a dialectics that is absent in 
functional relations. The introductory question is: from where does the decision 
spring that arises in every crisis? The fi rst thing to note is that the path of 
decision becomes clear in temporal terms only after its realization. It cannot be 
convincingly predicted in the run-up to its becoming reality. Only ‘because’ in 
a concrete case in the end ‘there was a decision for love or hate, was the former 
or latter the stronger’ (Weizsäcker, 1950: 314). In epistemological terms, this 
means: ‘In a genuine crisis, the decision creates itself, is beginning and origin. 
You cannot explain it. Rather, other things become explainable through it’ 
(pp. 314–15). The second matter of note is that necessity and freedom appear 
interwoven in a constitutive manner in experiencing. The crisis-ridden decision 
is at the same time both a ‘must’ and a ‘want’, an obligation and a desire. To 
experience it as a ‘must’ entails the experience of necessity. To experience it 
H. WIEDEBACH: WEIZSÄCKER’S MEDICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 373
as a ‘want’ entails the experience of freedom.18 In exact terms, it is not possible 
to say that here is a decision between free and necessary action ‘dynamically, 
say by motivations or causal effects … Rather, only after the fact do we learn 
what wanting was actually successful, what sort of must prevailed’ (p. 315).
If you wish to derive from this some insight into the origin of the decision, 
then it is necessary to note: only ‘the pathic [itself] can be defi ned as the origin 
of desire and obligation, I want to and I must. It created the specifi c wanting 
and obligation’ (p. 315). In Weizsäcker’s view, this already holds for the general 
‘relations of arbitrary movement’ as a whole, and likewise in connection with 
their obstruction, for example in a ‘hysterical paralysis’.19 If all that were 
available here was ‘natural-scientifi c causality for an “objective” description 
… then it would be incorrect for that act.’ It is limited:
to one factor, namely that of causal necessity. But this is present in the bio-
logical act only to the extent that it is counterposed to freedom. Because, 
and we repeat, the origin of the act is decision, and that is tantamount to 
a struggle between necessity and freedom, between ‘I must’ and ‘I want’. 
(p. 316)
But critical refl ection pays another call. Isn’t this a falling back on the deus ex 
machina of so-called ‘decision’ which cuts every Gordian knot? Ultimately the 
question addresses the diffi cult basic concept of Weizsäcker’s theory of life, the 
so-called Gestaltkreis. It is intended to create an image for the biological act, 
but it would be mistaken to seek to interpret it directly in terms of imagery. 
He writes: ‘Every biological act is conceived as a circle of Gestalt or confi gur-
ation, not a link in a chain, not a number in a series, but compared with what 
went before a transformation, there “before” and here “after”, a revolutio’ 
(pp. 316–17). In contrast with physical movement, an expression of life is essen-
tially self-movement: ‘Life appears where something is moving [itself]’ (p. 318). 
It is a ‘spontaneous event. An infant appears, a life is snuffed out, a bird fl ies or 
dives down on some prey, a human being wakes up, falls sick.’ The concept 
of origin is intended to respond to this spontaneity, played out in freedom and 
necessity. Weizsäcker notes: ‘biology learns that what is living is always with 
a determination whose ground cannot itself become an object’ (p. 318). Thus it is 
‘behaviour towards a ground that cannot be objectifi ed. It is not, as in causality, 
a relation between things that can be known, such as cause and effect.’ The 
‘ground relation’ [Grundverhältnis]:
is a power and can be experienced as dependence or freedom. Both can 
be experienced to the point where they are almost equal in their similarity, 
and that is why we try to designate this by an expression that encompasses 
both. However, we are at the boundary of the possibility of expression itself, 
since ex defi nitione no objectifi cation is possible any longer. (pp. 318–19)
The theory used for presentation is then itself entangled in a crisis. None-
theless, whatever can still be said against the suspicion of a deus ex machina 
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would have to draw its authority from the activity of humans (and doctors) 
proving themselves in everyday life, and not from some theory.
In closing, I would just like to take a brief look at the contour which 
Weizsäcker tries to give the ‘ground relation’ in this realm of practical everyday 
affairs. The experience of a ‘law’ or path of living is important here; on the one 
hand it has features that are generally valid and, on the other, it speaks to reality 
which is always determined by a situation as a special ‘commandment’. This 
internal voice of a law becoming a concrete commandment has to be heard. 
He talks about this for the fi rst time in one of his earlier essays entitled ‘Case 
history’ (Weizsäcker, 1928: esp. 60–3). In it he describes how a doctor and 
patient, together exploring the path of suffering which has brought the patient 
to the doctor, meet – but how they also miss each other, even in the encounter. 
He asks: ‘How can they both educate themselves to maintain the actual case 
history, stay close to it constantly, return to it if they deviate?’ (p. 60). Once 
again what is important is to recognize the ‘leading element’ in the mutual inter-
penetration of pathic and functional elements. This has its consequences in 
‘symptom and consciousness’.
Here ‘neither an ethical postulate nor one of energetics can help’ (p. 60). 
Sickness is not a concept of guilt, not some sort of ethical failure or messing 
things up, no defect in a physiological system. ‘The fi rst of the tasks to be solved 
is that something real must be described and made real in consciousness, not 
something forbidden’ (p. 60). Nonetheless, there is a valid norm: fi nally what is 
‘real’ proves to be what is commanded, and one has, so to speak, to track down, 
search out this commandment, this obligation, which as a norm also repre-
sents freedom. So this does not involve some anarchic principle or some sort of 
a breaking loose, either from the biological-physiological structure, or from the 
historical conditioning factors of human life. Nonetheless, the decision about 
the reality given to these forms is always open: ‘We know that form and law 
can be both something forbidden and something commanded. It can involve 
its fulfi lment but also its rupture’ (p. 61). There is no theoretical anticipation 
possible here. What remains accessible to knowledge is the ground of trust 
of the way of decision itself. ‘The capacity for knowledge is not hostile to the 
invisible forces of drive, impulse and urge, and the visible forces of the norms 
and laws. Rather, it is native: true intelligence wants the same thing’ (p. 61). 
In the ‘use of this intelligence’ (p. 61), a power of judgement, which in the 
human experience of everyday life encompasses equally both what is pathic and 
what is functional, medicine retains its indispensable basis of humanity.
Notes
 1. See Rainer-M. E. Jacobi’s biographical introduction to the brochure of the Suhrkamp 
Verlag (Frankfurt a.M.) for the volumes of Weizsäcker’s Gesammelte Schriften (published 
autumn 2006).
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 2. The family name Weizsäcker is very well known in Germany. Viktor was the uncle of 
Richard von Weizsäcker, who was president of West Germany from 1984 to 1994, and of 
Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, the controversial nuclear physicist and philosopher. He 
was the brother of Ernst von Weizsäcker, a major diplomat in the Third Reich.
 3. This is the fi rst, and later much repeated, sentence in Viktor v. Weizsäcker’s main meth-
odological work Der Gestaltkreis (Weizsäcker, 1950: 83, 295, 303). He attempts here to 
describe the unity of movement and perception.
 4. http://www.viktor-von-weizsaecker-gesellschaft.de/
 5. Unless otherwise stated, italic words in translated quotes are as in the original.
 6. At this point, Weizsäcker considers the concept of origin to be ‘unfortunately drained, 
spent’. Presumably this refers especially to Heidegger, possibly also to Marburg’s Neo-
Kantianism. Nonetheless, he thinks it is impossible to manage without that concept.
 7. To make a positive defi nition out of this negative formulation, such as that in every illness 
there are physical and mental elements at play and mutually interacting, would be the fi rst 
step towards a psychosomatics. Weizsäcker was very reserved in his statements on this, 
even though he is often called one of the founding fathers of psychosomatic medicine. 
 8. See the detailed case studies in Weizsäcker, 1941, 1947, 1951: esp. Part I: 325–482.
 9. This is also August Böckh’s methodological defi nition of his discipline: classical philology 
was basically a ‘knowledge of what has come to be known’ (Erkenntnis des Erkannten); 
Böckh, 1886: 10.
10. See the theories of a ‘relative nothing’ in knowledge in the work of Hermann Cohen und 
Franz Rosenzweig. 
11. The most generalized interpretation of this theorem is in Auersperg, 1965: 26–32.
12. Cf. similar consequences with respect to experiments, conducted by Paul Vogel, in 
Weizsäcker, 1933: 40 f.
13. An important alternative concept is ‘coherence’; see Weizsäcker, 1933: 35 ff.
14. See Sack, 2005: 73 for references to Weizsäcker’s reception of ‘coincidental parallelism’ 
(Weizsacker, 1950: esp. 291 ff.).
15. See the differentiated criticism by König, 1978: 208 and esp. 211–17.
16. Quoted a number of times in Lamprecht and Johnen, 1994; see, e.g., Uexküll, 1994: 32.
17. ein Durchgang des unstetigen Endlichen durch eine Transzendenz zur Stetigkeit eines Endlichen.
18. I leave aside for the moment the associated sceptical psychodynamic question as to whether 
and when one can in general want something, and further links of pathic categories.
19. Currently classifi ed as ‘dissociative stupor’.
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